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Abstract: 
The European Central Bank has assigned a special role to money in its two pillar strategy and 
has received much criticism for this decision. The case against including money in the central 
bank’s interest rate rule is based on a standard model of the monetary transmission process 
that underlies many contributions to research on monetary policy in the last two decades. In 
this paper, we develop a justification for including money in the interest rate rule by allowing 
for imperfect knowledge regarding unobservables such as potential output and equilibrium 
interest rates. We formulate a novel characterization of ECB-style monetary cross-checking 
and show that it can generate substantial stabilization benefits in the event of persistent policy 
misperceptions regarding potential output. 
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Contrary to the monetary policy strategies of the U.S. Federal Reserve and many
inﬂation-targeting central banks, which assign no special role to monetary aggre-
gates, the European Central Bank has maintained a separate and important role
for money in its two pillar strategy. The ECB distinguishes an ‘economic’ and a
‘monetary’ pillar:1
• “Economic analysis assesses the short to medium-term determinants of
price developments. The focus is on real activity and ﬁnancial conditions
in the economy. The economic analysis takes account of the fact that price
developments over those horizons are inﬂuenced largely by the interplay of
supply and demand in the goods, services and factor markets.”
• “Monetary analysis focuses on a longer-term horizon than the economic
analysis. It exploits the long-run link between money and prices. The
monetary analysis mainly serves as a means of cross-checking,f r o ma
medium to long-term perspective, the short to medium-term indications for
monetary policy coming from the economic analysis.”
In terms of economic theory, the long-run link noted by the ECB is related to the
equation of exchange, that is, the deﬁnition of the velocity of money. Rewritten in
growth terms it relates money growth, inﬂation and output growth to the change
in velocity. In the long-run, once output growth and the change in velocity have
settled down to trend, the equation of exchange implies a proportional relation-
ship between money growth and inﬂation. In terms of empirics, this relationship
has manifested itself most clearly in periods of very high inﬂation. Recent empir-
ical assessments, however, have re-emphasized its validity in periods of moderate
to low inﬂation in leading industrial economies.2
On this basis, Gerlach (2003, 2004) has proposed to augment the standard
Phillips curve, which accounts for shorter-term inﬂation dynamics, resource uti-
lization gapsand inﬂationary shocks, withameasure oflong-run orlow-frequency
money growth. Such an augmented Phillips curve uniﬁes the two pillars of the
ECB in a single assessment of inﬂationary risks, and—if treated as a structural
relationship—provides a rationale for including ﬁltered money growth in the cen-
tral bank’s optimal interest rate rule. The ECB’s description of its strategy, how-
ever, does not rely on a direct effect of money on inﬂation in the Phillips curve.
Rather, it focuses on the long-run link and its usefulness for identifying medium-
to long-term inﬂationary risks. Thus, we aim to develop an alternative rationale
1See http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/monetarypolicy2004en.pdf.
2cf. Gerlach (2003), ECB (2004), Pill and Rautanen (2006), Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach
(2006).
1for including money in the policy rule that stays as close as possible to the ECB’s
stated reasons.3
We formally characterize ECB-style cross-checking using a policy rule with
two components. The ﬁrst component aims to control inﬂationary risks based
on a standard Phillips curve and aggregate demand relationship. Essentially, it
is the optimal interest rate rule of an inﬂation-targeting central bank. If imple-
mented successfully this rule should ensure that inﬂation averages around the
central bank’s inﬂation target. Its weakness is that it relies on knowledge of un-
observables such as the equilibrium real interest rate and potential output that
may be subject to large and persistent policy misperceptions.
The second component captures the idea of cross-checking using the long-
run relationship between money and inﬂation. We assume that the central bank
checks regularly whether a ﬁltered money growth series adjusted for output and
velocity trends averages around the inﬂation target. If the central bank obtains
successive signals of a sustained deviation of inﬂation from target it adjusts inter-
est rates accordingly.
Our simulations indicate that persistent policy misperceptions regarding po-
tential output induce a policy bias that translates into persistent deviations of
inﬂation and money growth from target. In this case, our “two-pillar” policy rule
may effectively overturn the policy bias. Cross-checking relies on ﬁltered series
of actual money and output growth without requiring estimates of potential out-
put. Indirectly, however, it helps the central bank to learn the proper level of
interest rates.
2 Money growth and inﬂation in the long run
The equation of exchange deﬁnes velocity, vt = −mt + pt +yt,w h e r e(m,y,p)
denote the logarithms of money, output and the aggregate price level. Taking ﬁrst
differences we approximate the equation in growth terms:
Δvt = −Δmt +Δpt +Δyt. (1)
Δ is the ﬁrst-difference operator. In the long-run, output growth and the change in
velocity will settle down to trend and reveal a proportional relationship between
money growth and inﬂation. In the short-run, however, ﬂuctuations in velocity
and output growth are likely to obscure this relationship. The behavior of velocity
may be characterized as a function of the nominal interest rate i, real output and
3See, e.g., Issing (2005) for a detailed discussion of the function that the monetary pillar plays
for the conduct of the ECB’s monetary policy.
2money demand shocks εmd using a standard money demand equation:
mt − pt = γyyt −γiit +εmd
t . (2)
Here, γy denotes the income elasticity and γi the semi-interest rate elasticity of
money demand. Money demand shocks are assumed to be normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2
md. Taking ﬁrst differences, re-arranging (2) and
combining with (1) we obtain:
Δv =( 1−γy)Δy+γiΔi+Δεmd. (3)
Long-run equilibrium values (superscript *) can then be determined as follows.
In the long-run, money demand shocks would average to zero, and the nominal
interest rate would settle down to its steady state level. Thus, the long-run trend in
velocity corresponds to Δv∗
t =( 1−γy)Δy∗
t , and long-run inﬂation is proportional
to long-run money growth adjusted for output and velocity trends:4
Δp∗
t = Δm∗
t −γyΔy∗
t (4)
Recent studies obtained empirical support for this long-run relationship using
various ﬁlters or frequency-speciﬁc estimation. Andmore interestingly, they have
found money growth to lead inﬂation at this frequency. To give an example,
Gerlach (2004) uses the following ﬁlter
µ
f
t = µ
f
t−1+λ
 
µt −µ
f
t−1
 
, (5)
to approximate long-run values of inﬂation and money growth. In his work, µt
may alternatively stand for money growth Δmt or money growth adjusted for
output growth. In our paper we will follow equation (4) and adjust money growth
using the estimate of the income-elasticity of money demand, i.e.
µ
f
t = Δm
f
t −γyΔy
f
t . (6)
3 Monetary policy design without money
Most research on monetary policy rules in the last two decades has focused on
models, in which the monetary transmission mechanism works as follows: the
nominal interest rate affects the real interest rate due to price rigidity, the real rate
inﬂuences the output gap via aggregate demand and the output gap impacts on
4A trend in velocity may not only arise from potential output growth Δy∗
t with an income
elasticity γy different from unity, but also from other sources such as ﬁnancial innovations (see
Orphanides and Porter (2001) and Masuch, Pill and Willeke (2001)).
3inﬂation via a standard Phillips curve. Thus, monetary aggregates play no direct
role in the transmission of policy from nominal interest rates to inﬂation. Money
supply instead is determined recursively from a money demand equation.
Toillustrate this basic point weuse a simple New-Keynesian style model with
backward-looking expectations in the spirit of Svenssson (1997) and Orphanides
and Wieland (2000). The model consists of a Phillips curve and an aggregate
demand equation:
πt = πe
t+1+αy(yt −y∗
t )+επ,t, (7)
yt −y∗
t =
 
ye
t+1−y
∗,e
t+1
 
−βr(it −πe
t+1−r∗
t )+εy,t, (8)
where πe
t+1 = πt−1, ye
t+1−y
∗,e
t+1 = yt−1−y∗
t−1.
πt = Δpt denotes inﬂation, (επ,t,εy,t) stand for zero-mean cost-push and demand
shocks respectively with variances (σ2
π,σ2
y), r∗ denotes the long-run equilibrium
interest rate and the superscript e refers to market expectations, which we assume
to be backward-looking.
An inﬂation-targeting central bank would set the nominal interest rate it in
order to minimize expected discounted inﬂation deviations from target
min
it,it+1,...
Et
  ∞
∑
s=t
δs−t (πs−π )
2
 
, (9)
where π∗ denotes the central bank’s inﬂation target and δ its discount factor.
Consequently, optimal monetary policy corresponds to a Taylor-style interest rate
rule, which responds to lagged inﬂation and output gaps but not to money growth:
i
opt
t = r∗
t +πt−1+
1
αyβr
(πt−1−π∗)+
1
βr
(yt−1−y∗
t−1). (10)
The superscript ‘opt’ refers to ‘optimal’.
To be clear, the central bank achieves the desired interest rate setting by
conducting open-market operations that inﬂuence the money supply. Thus, the
money supply is determined according to the money demand equation (2) consis-
tently with the desired policy rate, current output and the price level. However,
money does not appear as a variable in the central bank’s optimal interest rate
rule.
Inspired by the evidence for the long-run relationship between money and
inﬂation, Gerlach (2003, 2004) proposed to include a ﬁltered measure of money
growth oradjusted moneygrowth in the estimation ofthe short-run Phillips curve.
If a central bank were to consider this empirical two-pillar Phillips curve as a
structural relationship it would conclude that a measure of ﬁltered money growth
4should enter in its interest rate rule.5 Such a rule could be viewed as an inter-
pretation of the ECB’s two-pillar strategy. However, the ECB’s description of
its strategy does not rely on a direct effect of money on inﬂation in the Phillips
curve. Rather, it uses the monetary pillar to accumulate evidence signalling trend
changes in inﬂation.
4 ECB-style cross-checking and policy design
We develop a characterization of ECB-style cross-checking that stays as close as
possible to the ECB’s own description. Our proposed interest rate rule has two
components:
iCC
t = iEA
t +iMA
t (11)
Here the superscript CC refers to cross-checking, EA to the interest rate setting
implied by the ECB’s ‘economic analysis’ and MA to an additive adjustment in
interest rate setting that arises from the ECB’s ‘monetary analysis’. We set the
ﬁrst component equal to the optimal interest rate rule in the baseline model:
iEA
t = i
opt
t as deﬁned in equation (10). (12)
This interest rate setting should ensure that inﬂationary risks based on a standard
Phillips curve are controlled perfectly and inﬂation ﬂuctuates randomly around
the mean, π∗. However, this component relies on knowledge of unobservables
such as the equilibrium real interest rate, r∗, or potential output, y∗, that may be
subject to large and persistent policy misperceptions.
The second component, iMA
t , is novel and captures the idea of cross-checking
using the long-run relationship between money and inﬂation. This component is
additive and persistent, because it is intended to offset persistent policy biases due
to imperfect information. We assume that the central bank regularly tests whether
ﬁltered and adjusted money growth, µf, still averages around the inﬂation target.
Thus, the central bank computes the normally-distributed test statistic,
κ =
µ
f
t−1−π∗
σµf
, (13)
and checks whether κdeviates from a critical value κcrit. σµf denotes the standard
deviation when iEA
t = iopt is implemented with correct values of potential output
and the mean of µf corresponds to π∗. If the central bank obtains successive
signals of a sustained deviation from target, i.e. (κ > κcrit for N periods) or (κ <
5We develop this argument further in the working paper version (Beck and Wieland (2006)).
5−κcrit for N periods), it responds by adjusting interest rates accordingly.6
iMA
t =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
iMA
t−1+( 1
αyβr)(µ
f
t−1−π∗) if κ > κcrit or κ < −κcrit for N periods
iMA
t−1+0e l s e
(14)
As long as iEA
t = i
opt
t is implemented with full knowledge of potential output, y∗
t
and the real equilibrium rate, r∗, cross-checking with regard to iMA
t will almost
never lead to an adjustment in interest rates. With imperfect knowledge, however,
cross-checking may occasionally have very important effects on policy.7
5 Cross-checking and policy misperceptions
Recent research exploiting data on historical revisions to real-time estimates of
the output gap has identiﬁed very persistent policy misperceptions.8 The persis-
tence of measurement errors arises primarily from biased estimates of unobserv-
able potential output. Thus, if a central bank relies on potential output measures
in policy design, its policy stance may be biased for a sustained period of time.
To illustrate this effect we deﬁne the policymaker’s estimate of potential output,
ˆ y∗
t = y∗
t +biast, as the sum of true potential output and a measure of the misper-
ception denoted by biast, and include it in the baseline rule:
iEA
t = i
opt
t = r∗
t +πt−1+
1
αyβr
(πt−1−π∗)+
1
βr
(yt−1−y∗
t−1−biast−1). (15)
The resulting bias in interest rate policy will induce a persistent deviation of in-
ﬂation from target. For example, if the central bank’s estimate of potential output
were to remain permanently 1% above its true level (i.e. biast = 1∀t), average
inﬂation would increase by (αyβr)(βr)−1 percentage points.
To illustrate this point further we calibrate the model deﬁned by equations
(7), (8) and (2) (see Beck and Wieland (2006)) and simulate the interest rate rule
6The response coefﬁcient on inﬂation deviations from target is the same as in iEA
t , namely 1
αyβr.
7The two parameters of iMA
t , κcrit and N play different roles. κcrit reﬂects the probability that an
observed deviation of µf from π  is purely accidental (for example a 5% or 1% signiﬁcance level).
N deﬁnes the number of successive deviations in excess of this critical value. Thus, the greater N
the longer the central bank waits to accumulate evidence of a sustained policy bias. For example,
if κcrit is set to the 1% critical value for the normal distribution (2.575) and the critical number
of periods of sustained deviations N is set to 4, the probability of such an event in the absence of
policy misperceptions would be less than 10−8.
8For example, Orphanides et al. (2000) estimate a process of misperceptions with a near unit
root (0.96) and standard deviation of 3.77%
6(15) with the following sequence of misperceptions:
for t =( 1,10) bias(t)=0
for t =( 11,12,13,14) bias(t)=( 1,2,3,4)
for t =( 15,100) bias(t)=4
for t =( 101,102,103) bias(t)=( 3,2,1)
for t =( 104,200) bias(t)=1
(16)
The central bank’s initial estimate of potential output is assumed to coincide with
the true value. In periods 11 to 14 the central bank begins to overestimate po-
tential output leading to a bias of 4% from period 14 onwards. From period 100
onwards the central bank’s overestimate of potential output declines to 1%.
Figure 1: Misperceptions, Money-Inﬂation Link and Cross-Checking
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Output gap misperceptions and the money−inflation link
Output gap misperceptions and ECB−style cross−checking
The top row of four panels in Figure 1 presents a simulation of the con-
sequences of these misperceptions given a single draw of normally-distributed
cost-push, demand and money demand shocks. The resulting, persistent increase
in inﬂation cannot immediately be seen from current realizations but is eventu-
ally revealed by the ﬁltered measures of inﬂation, πf, and money growth, Δmf.
It amounts to 2% because the calibrated value of αy is 0.5.
This simulation illustrates the long-run relationship between money growth
and inﬂation. and emphasizes the weakness of the policy rule, iEA
t = iopt,i nt h e
event of persistent misses on potential output. A similar effect would arise from
incorrect estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate r∗.
7Of course, one may argue that the central bank will learn from its mistakes.
Thus, we proceed to show that cross-checking as deﬁned by the rule in equation
(14) provides an effective avenue for learning and correcting the central bank’s
policy bias. We repeat the preceding simulation using the cross-checking rule,
iCC
t deﬁned by (14) which includes an additive and persistent adjustment in the
event of sustained deviations of ﬁltered (adjusted) money growth from target. The
outcome is reported in the second row of panels in Figure 1. We have dropped
the panel with actual money growth, Δm, and have instead included a panel re-
porting the bias in the central bank’s estimate of potential output, biast,a n dt h e
adjustment in interest rates due to cross-checking. This adjustment corresponds
to iMA
t as deﬁned in equations (14) and (13). The cross-checking rule responds to
the increase in ﬁltered money growth µ
f
t−1 fairly quickly after the policy bias has
arisen. The interest rate adjustment of ( 1
αyβr)(µ
f
t−1−π∗) almost perfectly offsets
the policy bias arising from potential output, ( 1
βr)(biast−1). Once the mispercep-
tion of potential output declines after period 100, cross-checking soon leads to
another adjustment of interest rates.9
6 Outlook
We have presented the ﬁrst formal characterization of ECB-style cross-checking.
Underthe unrealistic assumption that thetrue values ofpotential output areknown
to the central bank our speciﬁcation of cross-checking would never come into
play. However, with imperfect knowledge there is a possibility of policy misper-
ceptions. These misperceptions may generate sustained deviations of inﬂation
from target. Due to the long-run link between money growth and inﬂation these
deviations are also apparent in ﬁltered measures of money growth. Thus, a cen-
tral bank that responds to persistent and signiﬁcant deviations of money growth
by adjusting interest rates can effectively offset the policy bias arising from mis-
perceptions about potential output and other unobservables.
Our ﬁndings open up several interesting avenues for further research. For ex-
ample, allowing for unforeseen, permanent shifts in velocity, i.e. shifts in money
demand parameters, the information content of long-run money growth would
depend on how quickly the central bank learns the new parameter values. Fur-
thermore, we have focused on strict inﬂation targeting with backward-looking ex-
pectations. In this case, cross-checking for persistent shifts is relatively straight-
9To assess the sensitivity of our ﬁndings we performed several Monte Carlos exercises. We
drew 1000 series of shocks of length 200 from a normal distribution and considered the perfor-
mance of our cross-checking rule under alternative parameter settings for λ and κcrit. We found
that, on average, cross-checking leads tothe appropriate interest rate adjustments offsetting the pol-
icy bias due to output gap misperceptions. The results are reported in Beck and Wieland (2006).
8forward as inﬂation and adjusted money-growth are expected to be white-noise
processes. Extending the analysis to allow for partially forward-looking market
expectations would not change this feature of our economy. However, ﬂexible
inﬂation targeting (with the output gap in the central bank’s loss function) would
introduce mean reversion in inﬂation and adjusted money growth dynamics. In
this case, a more sophisticated test may be required for cross-checking. Finally,
our baseline model may be extended to render ﬁltered money growth a leading
indicator of ﬁltered inﬂation, such that it clearly dominates ﬁltered inﬂation as
the object of cross-checking.
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